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Abstract 
We assess whether the gender gap in authority in Sweden has changed during 
the period 1968–2000, and investigate to what extent family factors are respon-
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period, and identify the life-event of parenthood as a major cause of the gap. 
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The Swedish society has become well-known for its high degree of equality 
between men and women. Sweden consistently ranks in the top in international 
comparisons of the degree of gender equality (e.g. United Nations Develop-
ment Programme 2005). Swedish women have a higher labor market partici-
pation rate than women in most other countries (Jaumotte 2003) and the wage 
gap between working men and women is low in an international perspective 
(Blau & Kahn 2003; Waldfogel 1998). Furthermore, Swedish women are not 
economically dependent on their husbands to the same extent as are their 
counterparts in other countries (Evertsson & Nermo 2004; Hobson  1990; 
Sørensen 1994). 
Yet, there remain substantial inequalities between Swedish men and 
women, and one of the more pronounced is the gender gap in workplace 
authority. Few women are found at the top of business firms (Henrekson 2004), 
and female employees less often have managerial positions and subordinates 
(Hultin 1998; Mueller, Kuruvilla & Iverson 1994). This may not be surprising, 
given the fact that the gender gap in authority seems to be a universal 
phenomenon. Surprising, however, is the finding that the gap seems to be rela-
tively large in Sweden compared to that in many other developed countries 
(Baxter & Wright 2000; Mandel & Semyonov 2006; Rosenfeld, Van Buren & 
Kalleberg 1998; Wright, Baxter & Birkelund 1995), even though it has been an 
explicit policy goal that more women should fill managerial positions 
(e.g., Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications 2003). 
An equal gender distribution in authority in the workplace is important not 
only because authority positions reward the individual with prestige, power, 
autonomy, and status; gender differences in authority attainment also account 
for a part of the gender wage gap (England et al. 1994; Halaby  & Weak-
lim 1993; McGuire & Reskin 1993). Moreover, authority is of particular perti-
nence for another reason: ”(B)ecause of the real power associated with posi-
tions in authority hierarchies, gender inequalities in authority may constitute 
one of the key mechanisms that sustain gender inequalities in workplace out-
comes. The under-representation of women in positions of authority, especially 
high levels of management, is not simply an instance of gender inequality; it is 
probably a significant cause of gender inequality” (Wright  et  al.  1995:407). 
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gender equality also on lower levels in the work organization.
1 Another 
argument for increased gender equality in workplace authority, though less 
often mentioned, is that if women – for different reasons – choose not to strive 
for power and authority, or if they are systematically debarred from these 
positions, the society as a whole suffers; it misses the unexploited talent that 
these women constitute. 
Studies on the gender gap in authority have exclusively been based on 
cross-sectional (and predominantly U.S.) data. Hence our knowledge about this 
phenomenon is limited. Although studies have uniformly shown that women 
have less authority than men do, we do not know much about whether the size 
of the gap has changed over time or about the mechanisms governing the 
process by which individuals move into and out of authority positions. 
In this paper, we will contribute to research aiming at describing and 
explaining the gender gap in authority in the following ways. We will assess 
whether the gender gap in authority in Sweden has changed during the period 
1968–2000, with and without control for relevant variables. We will further 
examine the mechanisms of allocation responsible for this gap by following 
individuals over time to examine what the correlates of change in authority are. 
We will focus on a hitherto surprisingly neglected aspect of the process behind 
the gap; the role of family-related responsibilities of men and women. It is a 
well-known fact that women in all societies take a larger responsibility for 
children and household chores. Relatively little is still known, however, about 
the impact of these responsibilities on women’s chances of gaining authority in 
the labor market. The results of the few studies that have been conducted are 
inconclusive. As pointed out in a recent review by Smith (2002), additional re-
search in this area is sorely needed in order to specify the relationship between 
these responsibilities and the attainment of workplace authority. 
                                                      
1 Studies have shown that the more male-dominated the managerial staff, the larger the gender 
wage gap among subordinate men and women (Cohen & Huffman 2007; Hultin & Szulkin 2003) 
and the lower the chances of promotion for subordinate women (Cohen, Broschak  & Have-
man 1998). 
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2.1 Workplace  authority 
Researchers have defined and operationalized the concept workplace authority 
in numerous ways, for example as the right to hire and fire, set the rate of pay, 
supervise the work of subordinates, the direct participation in policy decisions 
in the workplace, and formal hierarchical position (McGuire & Reskin 1993; 
Wolf & Fligstein 1979; Wright et al. 1995).
2 A common characteristic for these 
dimensions, however, seems to involve ”legitimated control over the work 
process of others” (Wolf & Fligstein 1979:236). Regardless of definition, pre-
vious studies have uniformly shown that women are less likely to exert work-
place authority than men are (Smith 2002). Moreover, when women are in 
positions of authority they are located at lower levels of management, i.e. they 
exert less authority than male managers (Hopcroft 1996; Jacobs 1992; 
Jaffee 1989). In accordance with most former studies the empirical part of this 
paper is based on measures of whether the respondent has subordinates (super-
visory authority) and, if so, the number of subordinates (span of control).
3 
2.2  Mechanisms behind the gender gap in workplace 
authority 
2.2.1  Family responsibility and human capital 
A large amount of evidence indicates that there are gender-specific ways of 
reconciling family and career-related demands (see, e.g., Blossfeld  & 
Drobnic 2001; Hakim 2000). In Sweden, gender differences in time devoted to 
                                                      
2 In his review Smith (2002:511) defines four types of workplace authority (not including 
ownership which may be viewed as “the ultimate form of authority”): i) Sanctioning authority or 
span of responsibility, i.e. “the ability to influence the pay or promotions of others”, ii) Decision-
making or managerial authority, i.e. authority which “relates to organizational policy decisions, 
control over products, services, budgets or purchases”, iii) Hierarchical authority position, i.e. 
“an individual’s formal location within the structure of organizational hierarchies” and iv) 
Supervisory authority, i.e. “whether an individual ‘supervises anyone on the job’” and, if so, 
span of control, i.e. “the number of people under direct supervision”. It should be noted that the 
different types of authority are not mutually exclusive. 
3 Unless otherwise stated this type of authority is what we henceforth refer to as “authority” and 
“workplace authority”. When we refer to previous studies we will explicitly mention if they 
apply to other types of authority (only). 
IFAU – The gender gap in workplace authority in Sweden 1968–2000 – a family affair?  5 household tasks seem to be triggered by cohabitation and childbearing: it is 
relatively small for single persons, but grows substantially larger among child-
less cohabiting couples and further increases when they have children, even 
when spouses devote identical time to paid work (Flood & Gråsjö 1997). In 
addition, women dedicate much more time to child care (The National Social 
Insurance Board 2003; Statistics Sweden 2003). As the children grow older, or 
leave the nest, this gender difference in household work remains largely un-
changed (Ahrne & Roman 1997; Hörnqvist 1997). Fathers normally work full-
time irrespectively of the age of their children, whereas mothers adjust their 
labor force attachments to the demands of parenthood (cf. Gornick & Meyers 
2003; Sundström 1997). A consequence of these differences is that Swedish 
women (mothers) commonly have less work experience than men (Edin & 
Richardson 2002; Hultin 1998; Mueller et al. 1994). Because prospects to reach 
positions with power, influence, and authority are conditioned by the individ-
ual’s human capital, there are reasons to believe that women’s chances to reach 
these positions deteriorate when they have children. Accordingly, human capi-
tal differences normally explain some of the gender gap in authority. Studies 
however consistently reveal a remaining and pronounced authority gap 
between women and men even after controlling for various indicators on 
human capital (Baxter & Wright 2000 [Australia, Sweden and USA]; 
Huffman & Cohen 2004 [USA]; Hultin 1998 [Sweden]; Jaffee 1989 [USA]; 
Kraus & Yonay 2000 [Israel]; Mitra, 2003 [USA]; Wright et al. 1995 [seven 
Western countries]).
4 Some studies also reveal that women receive smaller 
authority returns for the same formal merit as men (McGuire & Reskin 1993; 
also see review by Smith 2002),
5 but two Swedish studies do not find this 
(Hultin 1998; Mueller et al. 1994).
6 
Over and above human capital differences, family responsibilities might 
affect women’s authority attainment also in other ways. A net wage penalty 
associated with motherhood is a fairly stable empirical regularity across insti-
tutional settings (see, e.g., Budig & England 2001; Waldfogel 1998 [the U.S.]; 
                                                      
4 In Baxter and Wright (2000) authority is measured by formal position only whereas Kraus and 
Yonay  (2000) and Wright et al. (1995) add measures on sanctioning and decision-making 
authority. 
5 McGuire and Reskin (1993) use an index containing indicators on different types of authority, 
including supervisory authority. 
6 Also see Hopcroft (1996) and Jaffee (1989) for American studies (based on the same data set). 
Both studies use a variety of indicators on workplace authority, among them indicators on 
supervisory authority. 
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results for authority outcomes are less unequivocal. Hultin (1998) finds that 
Swedish women with children in the household have lower chances of exerting 
workplace authority compared to childless women, but no such child penalty is 
found for men. Rosenfeld et al. (1998) (using a nine-country dataset) and Wolf 
and Fliegstein (1979) (using two U.S. samples) report equal results for women, 
but in their studies men with children rather benefit. In addition, a British study 
finds that among top managers, women are much more often childless com-
pared to men (50 vs. 7 percent), suggesting that men can usually have a career 
as well as a family whereas women appear to choose between the two 
(Wyatt & Langridge 1996). In contrast to these results, more recent U.S. stud-
ies find no effects of children on authority, neither for men nor women 
(see Hopcroft 1996; Huffman & Cohen 2004; Mitra 2003). 
Comparing the authority outcomes of cohabiting/married working men and 
women to those of single working men and women, results are even more 
mixed. Hultin (1998) finds that Swedish men who are cohabiting or married 
experience an authority premium, but that civil status is unrelated to workplace 
authority among Swedish women. Rosenfeld et al. (1998) find a marriage/ 
cohabitation authority premium, but that it is given to both men and women. 
By contrast, Huffman and Cohen (2004) and Mitra (2003) (both using U.S. 
data) find that civil status is unrelated to authority for men and women alike.
7 
Controlling for human capital indicators, why would family conditions 
affect men’s and women’s labor market careers differently? According to 
Becker (1985), the remaining precedence for men in the labor market may be 
due to gender differences in work effort. Women’s greater household work and 
child care effort demand a large amount of time and energy. As a consequence, 
women may seek less demanding jobs, to be able to meet family and work 
obligations, and/or put less effort into market work. In contrast, others argue 
that women’s main responsibility for household chores and child care may 
rather signal (than actually cause) less work commitment among employers 
(see below) whereas it may point to more work commitment and stability for 
male employees (e.g., Bielby & Baron 1986). 
                                                      
7 In contrast to these conflicting results on the role of cohabitation/marriage for the gender gap in 
authority, a male marriage wage premium has been documented, in Sweden (Richardson 2000) 
and elsewhere (Ribar 2004). 
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Most studies, then, show that the gender gap in workplace authority can not 
entirely be explained by differences in observed individual traits between men 
and women. Explanations of the remaining gap have therefore been sought on 
the demand side. If employers’ decisions to hire or promote, for some reason, 
are gender biased in favor of men, they will disproportionately end up in posi-
tions of authority. Given that men and women are equally merited for these 
positions, gender bias in employer decisions are due to gender discrimination. 
Taste discrimination refers to employers preferring men for these positions 
irrespectively of them being more qualified than women, which would imply 
that employers are willing to pay for not having women in authority positions. 
Statistical discrimination refers to a decision rule when information about 
potential employees’ productivity is limited. Employers may then use easily 
observable characteristics, such as sex, as proxies for promotion suitability. For 
example, if employers know that women, on average, are more constrained by 
family responsibilities than are men, they should act on this information in their 
promotion decisions. High turnover rates in positions of authority can also be 
assumed to be especially costly for an employer, and to avoid these costs, they 
may avoid to hire women “at risk” of having children, or mothers of small 
children, for these positions. 
Direct evidence on gender discrimination as a mechanism behind the gender 
gap in workplace authority is rare. Some scholars argue along the line of proof 
by residual, i.e., that any unexplained gender difference after controls for indi-
cators on other possible predictors, must, at least partly, be due to discrimi-
nation (see, for example, Hultin 1998; Smith 2002 for discussions). The resid-
ual may, however, be due to measurement error and/or unobserved gender 
differences that are relevant to the exertion of authority, observed by employers 
but unobserved in the data used by researchers. 
Setting the difficulties with measuring discrimination aside, however, 
according to the taste discrimination hypothesis we would expect women to 
exert less workplace authority than men irrespective of their family situation. 
This perspective gives us no reason to expect that childless women will be 
treated differently by employers than women with children.
8 According to the 
                                                      
 
8 This assertion hinges on the assumption that employers do not have a taste for discriminating 
women with children. One could of course make an argument that because employers think a 
mother’s place is not in authority positions, they discriminate against mothers and rather choose 
men, and women who are not yet mothers, for these positions. Although we would not like to 
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employers to treat married and cohabiting women and mothers differently from 
the way they treat single women, women without children and men. Given the 
gendered division of household labor and child care, rational employers could 
assume married and cohabiting women and mothers to be less productive than 
other women and men and hence be less willing to award them with positions 
of authority. 
2.3  The gender gap in workplace authority – development 
over time 
We know very little about the changes in the workplace authority gender gap 
over time, in Sweden and internationally. This is due to the fact that previous 
studies are almost uniformly based on non-repeated cross-sectional data.
9 
What, then, could we expect of this development? Since the 1970s gender ine-
quality in a number of domains – education, employment rates, work hours, the 
gender wage gap, economic dependency within couples, household work hours, 
and use of parental leave – has decreased in Sweden (Bygren  & Duvan-
der 2004; Bygren, Gähler & Nermo 2004; le Grand, Szulkin & Tåhlin 2001).
10 
Although major inequalities remain, Swedish women of today should meet the 
labor market with more assets and possibilities relative to men than women did 
just a couple of decades ago. Moreover, the signalling effect of household vari-
ables should have become noisier over time, i.e. statistical discrimination might 
not be as prevailing as it used to be. Hence we would expect the aggregate 
gender gap in workplace authority to have decreased over time. 
                                                                                                                                 
discard this hypothesis altogether, we find it hard to believe that the very same employers who 
discriminate against mothers would treat men and women without children equally. Of course, 
one could imagine both kinds of taste discrimination operating, but then again, we find the 
reasons for employers exerting discrimination against all women more compelling, not least 
because sex is more easily observed compared to parenthood.  
9 A recent study by Meyersson Milgrom and Petersen (2006) shows, however, that the gender 
gap in “rank”, i.e. a job’s level of difficulty and responsibility among other things, narrowed in 
Sweden during the period 1970–1990 (also see Jacobs 1992 and Reskin & Padavic 1994 for 
American studies). 
10 During the period, Sweden has implemented a number of family-related policies aiming at 
replacing the male-breadwinner model with that of a dual-earner model. Important elements 
driving this transformation were the introduction of individual taxation of married couples in 
1971, the introduction of parental-leave benefits in 1974, and the expansion of public child care 
during the 1970s and 1980s (Duvander, Ferrarini & Thalberg 2005). 
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in Sweden is a probable cause of the relatively large gender gap in workplace 
authority there (see, e.g., Hakim 2000; Mandel & Semyonov 2006; Rosenfeld 
et al. 1998). In order to have access to the parental-leave benefit women must 
have and retain an employment relation when they have children. In practice, 
though, mothers have a relatively weak connection to the labor market in the 
period following childbirth, due to long periods of absence and/or part-time 
work. As employers normally prefer to promote (at least) full-time employees 
for authority positions, many women with small children may effectively be 
sorted out of the pool of employees considered suitable for filling these kinds 
of positions. Absence and part-time work among mothers arguably also give 
rise to statistical discrimination of female employees in fertile ages (Skard & 
Haavio-Mannila 1984, cited in Rosenfeld et al. 1998; Mandel  & Semyo-
nonv  2006). According to this view, we would expect the Swedish family 
policy model to have reinforced, or at least to have upheld, the gender gap in 
authority over time. 
2.4  The contributions of the present study 
As stated, data on the historical development of workplace authority is rare. 
More serious, however, is the fact that longitudinal panel data has not been 
used in this line of research. As a consequence the issue of unobserved selec-
tion effects has routinely been ignored. Selection issues have been extensively 
dealt with in studies of the male marriage wage premium and the motherhood 
penalty on wages, but in studies of workplace authority, none has hitherto used 
panel designs. All of what we know about the attainment of authority is based 
on data from cross-sections, which seems far from ideal if we want to approach 
a causal understanding of the authority attainment process. A  well-known 
weakness of cross-sectional data is that the effect of unobserved individual 
characteristics, which is correlated with observed independent variables, may 
give rise to omitted variable bias in the estimated coefficients. For example, a 
motherhood penalty on authority in a cross-section may have arisen because 
employers have used traits unobserved in the data to sort women into positions 
of authority. If these traits are correlated with the probability of getting a child, 
omitted variable bias in the estimated effect of motherhood would arise. In this 
study we have access to an individual-level panel data set covering a period of 
over thirty years. Because many individuals in this data set have been observed 
at more than one point in time, we are in our estimations able to account for 
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(see, e.g., Halaby 2004; Petersen 2004). In this way, we will be able to consid-
erably extend present knowledge about the role of selection processes 
generating the gender gap in authority. 
3  Data and analytical strategy 
The basic research questions we want to answer are: How has the gross gender 
gap in authority changed over time during the past decades? What is the role of 
family-related responsibilities in explaining the gender gap in authority? To 
answer these questions, we use cross-sectional and panel data from the Swedish 
Level of Living Survey (LNU) collected in 1968, 1974, 1981, 1991 and 2000.
11 
The respondents in each cross-section are a 0.1 percent random sample of the 
Swedish adult population aged 18–75 years. The unique strength of these data 
is that they include detailed and longitudinally identical measures of labor 
market related variables and family related variables. We will first model 
authority for the five cross-sections separately. Of particular interest here, 
besides describing the gross gender gap, is whether and in what direction the 
gender gap in authority has changed between 1968 and 2000, whether the 
correlates of authority have changed during the period of study, and to what 
extent it is possible to statistically explain the gender gap using our independ-
ent variables. In a second part of the empirical analysis, we will make use of 
the panel information, and model changes in authority as a function of changes 
in the independent variables. 
4 Variables 
To enable our empirical analysis, we excluded respondents who did not work at 
least one hour a week. Additionally, we excluded a small number of obser-
vations with internal non-responses on relevant questions. After these selec-
tions, the samples consisted of 2,816 respondents in 1968, 3,213 respondents 
                                                      
11 The response rates in the three cross-sections range from 90.8 percent in 1968 to 76.6 percent 
in 2000. See Gähler (2004) and Jonsson and Mills (2001) for more thorough descriptions of the 
Swedish Level of Living Surveys.  
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2,998 respondents in 2000 (which equals 15,798 observations in total). Due to 
the panel structure, the data contain information from 7,170 unique 
respondents, of which 63 percent participated in more than one cross-section of 
the survey. Below, we describe the variables used in the analyses. Descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table 1. 
In each survey, all employed respondents were asked identical questions 
about whether they currently had any supervisory tasks. Respondents with 
supervisory tasks were also asked how many subordinates they had. In 1968, 
1974 and 1981, the number of people supervised was collapsed into discrete 
groups at the time of the interview, whereas the exact reported number was 
used in 1991 and 2000. To achieve consistency over time, we constructed 
identical measures of authority across the panel cross-sections, using the 
following four categories: 0, 1–5, 6–10, and 11+ subordinates. For the inde-
pendent variable woman, we assigned the value 0 for males and 1 for females. 
We constructed three dummy variables indicating various dimensions of the 
respondent’s children. The first indicates the presence of one or more pre-
school aged children (0–6 years) in the household. The second indicates the 
presence of one or more children between the ages 7–20 in the household.
12 
Whether an individual exerts workplace authority or not is not only due to the 
present situation but also historical conditions, i.e. former family and 
household responsibilities. Given the present situation, former family 
responsibilities may have lasting effects on career outcomes. This has often 
been neglected in previous research in the field. With our third child-related 
variable we therefore indicate whether the respondent has grown up children 
(20+) that live in or outside the respondent’s household.
13 We used a 
dichotomous measure of marital status with value 1 if respondent is cohabiting 
or married, and value 0 if not. Further, we included a measure of household 
work hours per week, i.e.  the sum of the number of hours per week the 
respondent reports to spend on food purchasing, cooking, doing dishes, 
                                                      
12 7-18 years in the 1991 and 2000 surveys. 
13 18+ years in the 1991 and 2000 surveys. In a previous version of this paper, we also included a 
fourth child variable referring to whether the respondent has any children below the age of 20 
that do not live in the respondent’s household, indicating, in most cases, that the other biological 
parent or any other adult has the main responsibility for the child. This variable uniformly turned 
out to be insignificantly related to the dependent variable, why we excluded it from our models.  
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14 In the 1968, 1974 and 1981 surveys, the questions 
were not asked to single respondents. We therefore only use this variable for 
the years 1991 and 2000. To study the impact of labor market conditions we 
used four different indicators. We measured education in years of formal 
education. It refers to the question: “For how many years have you been in full-
time school and vocational education (from first grade and onwards)?”. 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for cross-sectional data (individuals working at 
least one hour a week) 
 Men  Women 
Year  1968 1974 1981 1991 2000 1968 1974 1981 1991 2000 
Number of subordinates, percent       
 0    71.9 70.5 69.7 69.3 70.4 85.2 85.6 81.0  81.6  80.3 
 1-5  subordinates  11.7 13.5 13.0 13.0 13.1 9.5 8.5 11.1  10.4  11.7 
 6-10  subordinates  5.5 5.8 7.3 7.1 6.3 2.2 2.4 3.8 3.7 3.7 
 11+  subordinates  10.9 10.2 9.9 10.5 10.2 3.1 3.5 4.0 4.3 4.3 
R’s children, percent       
  Child 0-6 yrs. in HH  24.8 25.1 19.3 19.4 14.4 20.4 20.0  20.7  19.2 
  Child 7-20 yrs. in HH
a 34.4 33.6 36.3 31.7 31.5 34.3 37.5 40.4  35.0  36.5 
  Child 20+ yrs. in/out of HH
b 24.3 23.3 23.2 26.8 28.0 26.6 25.7 28.5 32.2 35.9 
Cohabiting/married, percent  73.6 74.3 71.9 70.7 70.9 63.1 72.2 72.6  72.4  74.4 
Hours of paid work per week, 
mean 
42.8 39.7 38.9 39.1 39.1 34.4 31.8 31.5 33.8 35.1 
Education in years, mean  8.7 9.8 10.7 11.7 12.6 8.7 9.6 10.3  11.5  12.7 
Work experience in years, mean  22.8 21.5 20.7 20.0 20.1 15.1 14.3 15.6  16.7  19.2 
Seniority in years, mean  10.1 10.0 9.9 10.3 10.3 6.4 6.8 7.8  9.5  10.3 
Household work hours per 
week, mean 
n.a. n.a n.a. 7.3 7.3 n.a n.a n.a.  17.6  14.5 
Private sector, percent  78.6 74.4 70.2 70.7 71.8 54.5 49.1 40.3  39.1  39.1 
Number of observations  1750 1808 1801 1663 1531 1066 1405 1637  1670  1467 
Share of cross-section  62.1 56.3 52.4 49.9 51.1 37.9 43.7 47.6  50.1  48.9 
a 7-18 years in the 1991 and 2000 surveys. 
b 18+ years in the 1991 and 2000 surveys. 
 
                                                      
14 Whereas marital status and (number of) children in the household are only proxies for family 
and household obligations, household work hours per week is a direct measure on work effort at 
home and constraints to put energy on market work (alternatively preferences to use energy on 
family and household tasks). Only few, if any, previous studies include such a direct measure. 
Thus our study – unlike previous studies – can account for the fact that, e.g., women devote more 
time than men to household chores even when children are older or have left the household. 
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employment. It refers to the answer to the question: ”How many years 
altogether have you spent in gainful employment?”. We measured seniority as 
the number of years that had passed since the respondent was first employed by 
the current employer. The measure of hours of paid work per week refers to the 
question “How many hours per week do you regularly work?” As can be noted, 
the gender difference in labor market variables has declined markedly during 
the period. Still, however, there is a clear gender gap, in men’s favor, between 
fathers and mothers (not shown). Finally, we used a variable of sector of 
employment, private, with value 1 if the individual is employed by a privately 
owned firm, and 0 otherwise.  
5 Results 
5.1  Descriptives of the gross gender gap over time and age 
In Figure 1, we display the odds of finding a woman in a particular position 
with (or without) authority, relative to the share of women working. A number 
of patterns are noteworthy here. First, consistent with all other studies in this 
area of research, we find that women less often than men execute supervisory 
tasks. Second, the gender gap in authority becomes more and more pronounced 
the higher up in the authority hierarchy one gets. This finding is also consistent 
with other studies (e.g., Hopcroft 1996; Jacobs 1992; Jaffee 1989). The odds of 
a woman having a relatively small number of subordinates (1-5) is, averaging 
over time, around .9. For those with 6-10 subordinates, the odds drops to an 
average level of around .6, and for those with 11+ subordinates, it drops further 
to an average of .5. Third, during the period, the odds of women exerting 
authority increased substantially on all levels between 1974 and 1981 and, to a 
smaller extent, between 1991 and 2000. Hence during the 1970s there was a 
clear change in the direction towards more of gender equality in authority out-
comes, but this development levelled out in the beginning of the 1980s. The 
odds presented in Figure 1 hold constant the share of women working. How-
ever, one might also ask what the probability is that a position of authority is 
held by a woman in a given year. From Table 1 it is possible to calculate these 
proportions, and over the period it has increased from 24 percent in 1968 to 
39 percent in 2000. This is a combined effect of two changes that mainly took 
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force and that of a modest gender equalization of chances of getting into 
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Figure 1 The odds
a of a working woman being located in positions with differ-
ent amounts of authority, 1968, 1974, 1981, 1991, and 2000 
a Share of women in position i among all individuals in position i/share of women working 
>1 hour a week among all individuals working >1 hour a week 
 
In  Figure 2, we display the proportions having authority for different age 
groups, separately for men and women. One can note that men and women 
seem to start out at the same low level in their 20s, but that men have a much 
steeper “career curve”, peaking in their late 40s, declining thereafter. The 
women’s chances of having authority increase until they reach their 30s, but 
thereafter remain at a more or less flat level, significantly below that of men. 
We also broke down the figure by survey year. We found that, although the 
proportion with subordinates differs by year (for women), the age profile by 
gender only differs marginally. Hence men’s and women’s career development 
does not differ a great deal up until they reach their 30s, when they separate 
ways. Coincidentally, this point in life is also the age at which many men and 
women are in the stage of forming a family. The question that remains to be 
answered is whether these gender-specific career profiles are associated with 
family-related events. We next turn our attention to this issue. 






































Figure 2 Age profiles of proportions having at least one subordinate, by gender 
(pooled 1968-2000) 
5.2 Cross-sectional  regressions 
We conducted a number of alternative analyses, using various cutting points 
and categorizations of the measure of authority. Independently of authority 
measure and statistical method used, the results from these analyses were very 
similar.
15 For reasons of simplicity we therefore decided to use a dichotomized 
measure of workplace authority, i.e. whether the respondent has any subordi-
nates or not, and estimated the following linear probability model using this 
measure, for each survey year, and for men and women separately: 
 
( ) i ij j i X A P ε β α + + =      (1) 
 
                                                      
15 Using our four-category measure, we have estimated multinomial logit models, ordinal logit 
models, and linear regression (OLS) models. For 1991 and 2000, we had a continuous measure 
available. Using this measure, we estimated tobit models, and linear regression models on the 
logged and untransformed number of subordinates. We further experimented with different cut-
points for the dichotomous measure.  
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j Ai equals 1 if individual i has subordinates, otherwise zero.β  is the coefficient 
vector associated with  , and  ij X i ε  is the random error term for individual i. 
If the coefficient vector  j β  is multiplied by 100, we get the percentage point 
change associated with a unit increase in the independent variable. The linear 
probability model has two well-known weaknesses: it may give probability 
predictions outside of the interval 0 to 1, and the error term violates the linear 
regression assumption of homoscedasticity. As our main purpose with the 
regressions is to estimate the mean effects of the family-related variables, we 
do not consider the first weakness a serious one. The second weakness has 
potentially more serious implications, as standard errors thereby get biased and 
tests of significance will be invalid. To avoid this problem, we use 
Huber/White sandwich estimators of variance to obtain robust standard errors. 
These are valid in the presence of any kind of heteroscedasticity, and yield 
valid tests of significance. To have meaningful intercepts, we centered all con-
tinuous variables on their grand mean in the survey year. For each survey year, 
we introduce the family-related variables in a first model. In a second model 
we add education and our labor market variables. For some cross-sections, we 
have access to information on household work hours, and we then add this 
variable to the second model. 
 Table 2 Linear probability model estimates of authority on independent variables, and gender gap decomposition, by survey year
a 
        1968 1974 1981
                    Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
                          (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Child in HH 0-6  0.002  -0.025  0.011  0.003  -0.014  -0.043  -0.017  -0.021  -0.010  0.010  0.001  0.006 
                          (0.030) (0.032) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.025) (0.028) (0.024) (0.031) (0.026) (0.029) (0.024)
Child in HH 7-20  0.069**  -0.011  0.024  0.015  0.131**  -0.021  0.082**  0.019  0.094**  -0.007  0.035  0.001 
 (0.026)                        (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.020) (0.026) (0.021) (0.026) (0.020) (0.026) (0.021)
Child  20+                          0.035 -0.055* 0.016 -0.020 0.082** -0.037 0.075* -0.002 0.051 0.002 -0.001 0.019
                          (0.029) (0.024) (0.033) (0.024) (0.030) (0.023) (0.034) (0.025) (0.029) (0.023) (0.035) (0.025)
Cohabiting/married                          0.164** -0.013 0.094** 0.007 0.114** 0.018 0.055* 0.036 0.128** -0.045 0.055* -0.037
 (0.027)                        (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.028) (0.024) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023)
Education  yrs                  0.049** 0.032**     0.040** 0.028**     0.037** 0.030**
                   (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004)
Hrs paid work/wk (/10)      0.056*  0.047**      0.071**  0.043**      0.086**  0.035** 
                   (0.023) (0.010) (0.020)  (0.008) (0.016)  (0.009)
Seniority  yrs  (/10)                 0.061** 0.041*   0.049**  0.034* 0.088**  0.071**
                   (0.011) (0.019) (0.011)  (0.015) (0.014)  (0.018)
Work experience yrs      0.016**†  0.012**†      0.021**†  0.004†      0.017**†  0.007 
                   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)
Work experience squared (/100)      -0.027**†  -0.020**†      -0.038**†  -0.004†      -0.025**†  -0.012 
                   (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.006)  (0.008)
Private sector      -0.030  -0.044*      -0.064*  -0.056**      -0.034  -0.074** 
                   (0.028) (0.021) (0.025)  (0.018) (0.024)  (0.018)
Intercept                          0.127** 0.178** 0.236** 0.257** 0.150** 0.157** 0.280** 0.189** 0.166** 0.223** 0.258** 0.288**
                          (0.016) (0.020) (0.033) (0.029) (0.017) (0.019) (0.030) (0.028) (0.017) (0.021) (0.029) (0.030)
Adj.  R  squared                          0.04 0.00 0.16 0.12 0.05 0.00 0.17 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.16 0.10
Number of observations  1750  1066  1750  1066  1808  1405  1808  1405  1801  1637  1801  1637 
Decomposition of the gross 
gender gap
b 
            
Endowments (E)  -0.003  0.070**  0.000  0.054**  0.000  0.031* 
 (0.004)  (0.015)  (0.002)        (0.012) (0.002) (0.012)
Coefficients/Unexplained (C)                 0.116** 0.030 0.156** 0.064 0.120** 0.006
 (0.016)  (0.026)  (0.014)        (0.024) (0.015) (0.022)
Interaction EC                 0.019 0.031 -0.005 0.033 -0.008 0.075**
 (0.007)  (0.027)  (0.004)        (0.023) (0.004) (0.021)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 that coefficient is equal to zero (t-test), † p<0.05 that both terms in the polynomial are equal to zero (F-test). 
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. All continuous variables are centered on their grand mean in the survey year. 
b The variances/standard errors of the components in the decomposition of the gap are computed according to the method detailed in Jann (2005).  
 Table 2 Continued 
a 
      1991 2000
              Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)        (2) (3) (4)
Child in HH 0-6  -0.005  -0.028  0.027  -0.004  0.069*  -0.001  0.082*  0.016 
              (0.032)  (0.024)  (0.031) (0.025) (0.034) (0.029) (0.034) (0.030)
Child in HH 7-18  0.127**  0.003  0.039  -0.037  0.065*  0.045  0.013  0.060* 
              (0.028)  (0.021)  (0.028) (0.023) (0.028) (0.023) (0.029) (0.026)
Child 18+  0.073*  0.017  -0.001  0.005  0.102**  0.004  0.058  0.025 
              (0.029)  (0.023)  (0.036) (0.027) (0.030) (0.024) (0.038) (0.027)
Cohabiting/married                  0.140** 0.027 0.060* 0.013 0.058* 0.014 0.007 0.014
 (0.028)  (0.022)  (0.029)            (0.022) (0.029) (0.025) (0.029) (0.025)
Education yrs      0.038**  0.033**      0.037**  0.023** 
             (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Hrs paid work/wk (/10)      0.097**  0.029**      0.132**  0.052** 
             (0.016)  (0.010) (0.019) (0.011)
Seniority yrs (/10)      0.062**  0.039**      0.017  0.006 
             (0.014)  (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
Work experience yrs      0.017**†  0.013**†      0.009**†  0.003 
             (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Work experience squared (/100)      -0.023**†  -0.022**†      -0.010†  -0.002 
             (0.008)  (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Private sector      0.054*  -0.047**      0.047  0.060** 
             (0.024)  (0.018) (0.027) (0.021)
Household work hrs/wk (/10)      -0.045*  -0.002      -0.042  -0.028* 
              (0.020) (0.009) (0.024) (0.013)
Intercept                  0.149** 0.164** 0.180** 0.253** 0.193** 0.169** 0.209** 0.155**
              (0.016)  (0.019)  (0.030) (0.029) (0.019) (0.022) (0.038) (0.035)
Adj. R squared  0.06  0.00  0.17  0.09  0.02  0.00  0.11  0.05 
Number of observations  1663  1670  1663  1670  1531  1467  1531  1467 
Decomposition of the gross gender 
gap
b 
    
Endowments (E)             -0.001 0.017 -0.003 0.053**
 (0.002)  (0.014)      (0.003) (0.013)
Coefficients/Unexplained (C)  0.133**  -0.017  0.112**  0.010 
 (0.015)  (0.028)      (0.016) (0.025)
Interaction EC  -0.009*  0.122**  -0.010*  0.035 
 (0.004)  (0.029)      (0.004) (0.024)
** p<0.01, 
* p<0.05 that coefficient is equal to zero (t-test), 
† p<0.05 that both terms in the polynomial are equal to zero (F-test).
 
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. All continuous variables are centered on their grand mean in the survey year. 
b The variances/standard errors of the components in the decomposition of the gap are computed according to the method detailed in Jann (2005). 
 To analyze closer how much of the gender gap in authority that our variables 
are responsible for, we also conducted Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions for each 
cross-section. This procedure decomposes the gap into an “explained” part, due 
to average differences in endowments between men and women, and an “unex-
plained” part, due to differences in returns (coefficients, including the con-
stants) to these endowments between men and women, and an interaction 
between the “explained” and “unexplained” part.
16  
In Table 2, column 1 and 2 for each year, we report coefficients for the 
family-related variables only, for men and women separately. We can see that 
there are large gender-specific effects of the family situation of individuals.
17 
Throughout the period, having (had) children is associated with an authority 
premium for men (columns 1). This “fatherhood premium” varies somewhat 
between survey year, but is present in all cross-sections. For women, the corre-
sponding effect of having (had) children is, almost exclusively, insignificantly 
different from zero (columns 2). We can further see that there is a large cohabi-
tation/marriage premium for men, but that this premium has grown smaller 
over time; the net difference in having authority between cohabiting men and 
women has shrunk from 17.7 percentage points in 1968, to 4.4  percentage 
points in 2000. For women, marital status is generally not significantly 
associated with workplace authority in any year. It is also interesting to note 
that the intercepts, which in these models indicate the probability that 
noncohabiting childless individuals have subordinates, show that in this group 
the gender gap is very small, and even reversed in some cross-sections.  
The decompositions of the gender gap, reported in the lower rows of 
Table 2, indicate that the gap in these models almost entirely can be attributed 
to the fact that men have higher “returns” to their family situation. Taken 
                                                      
16 The gross authority gap 
F M A A −  (superscript M indicating males, F females) can, after some 
algebra, be decomposed into the following parts,  




























j X X X X X − − + − + − + − ∑ ∑ ∑
= = =
β β β β α α β
 
where the first term is the “explained” part of the gap, the second and third term is the 
“unexplained” part, and the fourth term is the part of the gap that comes from the interaction 
between the “explained” and “unexplained” components. The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
technique is attributed to Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). See Jones and Kelley (1984) for a 
graphical description of the equation.  
17 We use the word “effect” for language simplicity reasons. We are of course aware that it is not 
possible to determine the order of causality between the dependent and independent variables in 
this setting. 
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gender-related effects of family situation on the attainment of authority, and 
that the gender gap is statistically explained, or even reversed, once family-
related variables and gender-specific effects thereof are accounted for.  
When we add controls for labor market conditions, and education 
(columns  3 and 4), the tendency is that the raw fatherhood premiums are 
attenuated towards zero. Additional analyses (not shown) indicate that differ-
ences in education, work experience, and, to some extent, seniority, are respon-
sible for this premium. That is, part of the reason why fathers, and primarily 
fathers to older children, more often exert workplace authority is that they 
score higher on education and work attachment.
18 Moreover, the cohabi-
tation/marriage premium for men is also attenuated once the controls are intro-
duced, indicating that more work attachment and higher education among 
married and cohabiting men seems to be a mechanism partly generating this 
effect. 
The decompositions of the gender gaps in the full models essentially tell the 
same story. Once the controls have been included, the part of the gender gap 
that is unexplained/generated by differences in coefficients shrinks consid-
erably in all cross-sections. Instead, the parts of the gap that can be attributed to 
endowments, and the interactions between endowments and coefficients, 
increase in size. This indicates that the gap, apparently generated by male 
family premiums, in fact is generated by married or cohabiting fathers having 
higher levels of labor market and education endowments, and also reaping 
higher returns to these endowments.
  
When we add household work to the last models for the 1991 and 2000 
surveys, we find that it has the expected negative sign. However, adding 
household work does not significantly alter the other estimated coefficients of 
family-related variables, suggesting that these effects are not mediated by 
gender-specific differences in household work (results not shown). 
More generally, a clear impression of the indicators of model fit is that it 
has become increasingly more difficult to predict authority with observables. 
More associations turn insignificant and the R square values get lower over 
                                                      
18 The overall gender differences in these variables have decreased over time (see Table 1). 
However when mothers and fathers are compared, the gender differences in these variables tend 
to be higher. For example, fathers have more work experience than mothers. This is true in 1968 
(27 years compared to 17 years) as well as in 2000 (25 years compared to 22 years). 
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come more important for the attainment of authority over time. 
To sum up, we find that the gender gap in authority is mainly a gap existing 
among men and women who have (had) children and/or are cohabit-
ing/married. Whereas the gap between men and women with children is stable 
over time, the gender gap in authority within the group of married/cohabitants 
has declined. A substantial part of the gender gap in authority among parents, 
and the once large gender gap in authority among married/cohabitants is 
mainly due to differences in education and labor market variables, as well as 
differences in the returns to these characteristics. Throughout the period, the 
gap was absent or even reversed among single men and women. 
5.3 Panel  analysis 
In Table 3 we present results from regressions using data aggregated over the 
whole observation period 1968–2000. As a benchmark, we estimate the fol-
lowing “total” models pooled over time, for men and women separately. 
 
( ) it t ijt j it X A P ε γ β α + + + =      (2) 
 
This model is identical to the models estimated on the cross-sections, but the 
data here may contain the same individuals i across t, and we have added a 
period dummy  t γ  for each survey year. For the fixed effects models, we add to 
these models a dummy  i δ  for each individual i. 
 
( ) it i t ijt j it X A P ε δ γ β α + + + + =    (3) 
 
In effect, we thereby capture all observed and unobserved individual attributes 
that do not change over the observation period, as well as all observed and un-
observed gender-specific factors that for a particular survey year affect the 
probability to be transferred into a position of authority (because the models are 
estimated by sex). Our point of estimating this model is to show what happens 
to the dependent variable when individuals experience a family-related change,  
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19 What one needs to be aware of is that the 
fixed effects model uses only intra-individual variation to estimate effects, 
which means that these are only representative for the subselection(s) of indi-
viduals exhibiting such variation. Out of the sample of 7,170 individuals, only 
902  men and 593 women switch between having and not having authority 
during the period. A minority of the sample thus contributes to the estimation 
of these effects. This “selection criterion” also has the unintended consequence 
of making the group age with the panel. Its mean age is 32 in 1968 and 48 in 
2000. This is not a serious problem as our main purpose is to estimate unbiased 
effects of family-related changes. Note that the age effects are picked up by the 
time dummy variables  t γ  in the fixed effects regressions. 
The total pooled linear effects models reported in columns 1–2 and 5–6 in 
Table 3 can be seen as a summary of what has been shown in the previous 
analysis.
20 Hence estimates from this model show that women who have (had) 
children/are cohabiting/are married do not significantly differ in terms of 
authority from women who do not belong to these categories. Men, on the 
other hand, differ a great deal in their degree of authority depending on their 
family situation. Cohabiting and married men and fathers with children aged 7+ 
are much more likely to exert authority than are single and childless men. The 
sizes of the differences are non-trivial, with cohabiting men having a 
12 percentage point “authority premium” compared with noncohabiting men, 
and fathers of children above the age of six having a 7–10 percentage point 
“authority premium” compared to childless men. As for the cross-sectional 
regressions, a substantial part of these premiums can be statistically explained 
with education and labor market related controls. 
Results from the fixed effects model, reported in columns 3–4 for men and 
7–8 for women, partly underscore the findings from the total models but they 
also deviate from these findings in important ways, which suggests that the 
total model effects are biased due to unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
                                                      
19 It should be underscored that the fixed effects model does not eliminate the problem with the 
order of causality. The reason is that independent variables might not be exogenous. Hence we 
can not rule out a reverse causality. For example, individuals may change their family situation 
as a consequence of their labor market position (authority or no authority) rather than the other 
way around. 
20 Because individuals can be observed repeatedly, the standard errors are adjusted for intra-
individual correlation, using Stata’s cluster option. Still, the standard errors are reduced in size 
due to the increased number of individuals contributing to the estimation of effects. 
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ity compared to non-fathers. The estimated gains of fatherhood are even higher 
compared to the estimates from the total model, and the effect appears already 
when children are small (0-6 years old). Moreover, contrary to what was found 
in the total model, motherhood is accompanied by an increase of authority, but 
only of a lagged kind: it kicks in when the children are above the age of 20. 
When we add the controls the motherhood effect turns insignificant, and the 
fatherhood effects tend to decrease substantially, but stay significantly above 
zero; implying that much of the fatherhood effect, and all of the motherhood 
effect, can be attributed to an increase in labor market related inputs. 
We find that in the fixed effects model the cohabitation effect for women is 
positive and very close to that of men. There is, in other words, no clear male 
cohabitation/marriage premium visible in the fixed effects model, just a 
gender-neutral positive effect of cohabitation. For the cohabiting/married coef-
ficients, we can note that the effect for men is more than halved in the fixed 
effects model without controls. Once individual time-constant heterogeneity is 
accounted for, the “pure” positive effect on authority for men by entering into 
cohabitation is much smaller. This pattern suggests that there is a positive 
selection of men into cohabitation and marriage. All of the male (and female) 
cohabitation premium is captured by the controls, which suggests that cohabi-
tation for men and women is accompanied by an increase in investments rele-
vant to the exertion of authority. Because men, but not women, are positively 
selected into cohabitation, we only observe a male cohabitation/marriage 
premium in the (early) cross-sections. 
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ables. Individual panel data 1968–2000
a 
 Men,  total 
estimators 




Women, fixed effects 
estimators 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Child in HH 0-6  0.006  0.015  0.039*  0.047** -0.015  -0.001 -0.014  0.001 
 (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.016) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Child in HH 7-20
b 0.098**  0.037** 0.120**  0.039* 0.002 0.005  0.014  -0.006 
 (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.016) (0.010) (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.015) 
Child 20+
c 0.068**  0.031  0.093**  -0.007  -0.007 0.001 0.051** -0.006 
 (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.022) (0.011) (0.013)  (0.017)  (0.021) 
Cohabiting/married 0.121**  0.062** 0.054** -0.024  0.001 0.007 0.045* 0.025 
 (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.020)  (0.020) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.019) 
Education yrs    0.039**   0.015**  0.030**    0.019** 
   (0.002)  (0.005)    (0.002)  (0.006) 
Hrs paid work/wk (/10)    0.086**  0.076**    0.041**  0.039** 
   (0.009)  (0.012)    (0.004)  (0.007) 
Work experience yrs    0.016**†  0.013**†   0.008**†   0.007*† 
   (0.001)  (0.003)    (0.001)  (0.003) 
Work exp. squared 
(/100) 
 -0.025**†  -0.027**†   -0.012**†   -0.014**† 
   (0.003)  (0.004)    (0.003)  (0.005) 
Seniority yrs (/10)    0.056**  0.016   0.032**   0.013 
   (0.007)  (0.010)    (0.007)  (0.011) 
Private sector    -0.003    0.014    -0.032**   0.012 
   (0.014)  (0.025)    (0.010)  (0.019) 
Year 1974    0.006    0.085**    -0.020    0.015 
   (0.012)  (0.019)    (0.011)  (0.018) 
Year  1981   -0.010   0.134**    -0.007  0.059* 
   (0.014)  (0.032)    (0.013)  (0.027) 
Year 1991    -0.049**   0.186**    -0.067**   0.041 
   (0.015)  (0.052)    (0.015)  (0.041) 
Year 2000    -0.095**   0.196**    -0.106**   0.022 
   (0.017)  (0.071)    (0.017)  (0.055) 
Intercept 0.157**  -0.735** 0.185**  -0.416** 0.179** -0.336** 0.125** -0.271** 
 (0.009)  (0.045)  (0.014)  (0.074) (0.010) (0.028)  (0.014)  (0.066) 
            
R squared/R squared 
within 
0.04 0.15 0.03 0.08  -0.00 0.09  0.01  0.03 
Number of observations  8553  8553  7245  7245 
Number of individuals  3844  3844  3326  3326 
Number of auth. 
switchers 
 902  593 
Number of switches: up    727    457 
Number of switches: 
down 
 444  314 
** p<0.01, 
* p<0.05 that coefficient is equal to zero (t-test), 
† p<0.05 that both terms in the poly-
nomial are equal to zero (F-test).
 
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are adjusted for intra-individual cor-
relation in columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6).  
b 7-18 years in the 1991 and 2000 surveys. 
c 18+ years in the 1991 and 2000 surveys. 
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and women (those who exhibit variation in the variables of interest), the results 
indicate that when men and women become parents, men gain authority, 
whereas women’s chances stay constant. Further, men, unlike women, who are 
married or cohabiting are more likely to exert authority, but this seems to be an 
effect of a selection of authority-prone men into marriage/cohabitation. Taking 
individual selection and controls into account, the net effect of marriage/ 
cohabitation is zero for men, as well as for women. 
6 Concluding  discussion 
Research on workplace authority has uniformly shown that women are under-
represented in such positions. In this paper we raise two questions on this 
gender gap in workplace authority. First, how has it changed over time? 
Second, to what extent are family conditions, i.e. marital status and children, 
associated with the gender gap in workplace authority? We extend the second 
question by asking how the impact of family conditions has changed over time 
and whether family conditions are causally linked to workplace authority. 
Since almost all previous studies in the field are based on non-repeated cross-
sectional data, the present knowledge on these issues is limited. 
What, then, has happened to the gender gap in workplace authority over 
time? To answer this question we use Swedish Level of Living Survey data, 
covering the period 1968–2000. We find that in 1968, the proportion of women 
in authority positions, irrespective of the number of subordinates, was 
15 percent. This proportion had increased to just below 20 percent in 2000. For 
men the corresponding proportion has remained about or just below 30 percent 
throughout the period. Hence the relative chance for women to reach a position 
of authority in the labor market improved during the period. The most rapid 
change appeared in the 1970s, whereas the equalization has moved at a slower 
pace since the early 1980s. Moreover the levelling has been stronger on higher 
hierarchical levels (6+ subordinates), i.e. at levels where the gender gap was, 
and still is, most pronounced.
21 
                                                      
21 It is interesting to note that the development for the gender gap in workplace authority shows 
similarities to the gender wage gap trend. Analyses based on the same data set as here show that 
the gender difference in wages decreased substantially between 1968 and 1981 but has remained 
stable thereafter, despite the fact that women have increased their human capital, i.e. education 
and work experience, relative to men (Edin & Richardson 2002; le Grand et al. 2001).  
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clearly linked to age. As men get older their chance to hold an authority posi-
tion increases sharply and peaks in the age span 40–50 years, to gradually 
decrease thereafter. Women exhibit a different pattern. In their twenties they 
exert authority to the same extent as men do. At older ages, however, their 
promotion chances level off and remain at a substantially lower level than for 
men of the same age. Coincidentally, the gender dividing point appears in the 
early thirties, when many men and women have formed, or are about to form, 
a family. 
This finding leads us to our second main question: how are family condi-
tions related to the gender gap in workplace authority? In fact, our results point 
out family formation as a watershed generating this gap. As long as male and 
female employees are single and childless there is no male advantage in work-
place authority. In this group women are sometimes even overrepresented in 
positions of authority. This result contradicts the hypothesis on taste discrimi-
nation. If employers were systematically involved in such behavior, we would 
expect all women, regardless of their family situation, to exert less workplace 
authority than men. 
After men and women have become parents, a gender gap arises and lasts 
throughout the career (see Meyersson Milgrom & Petersen 2006 for a similar 
conclusion). Results from cross-sectional analyses reveal a “male marriage 
premium”, as well as a “fatherhood premium”.
22 However, no marriage pre-
mium can be observed in the panel analysis with individual fixed effects. This 
finding suggests that the premium was primarily generated by the fact that 
authority-prone men were selected into marriage and cohabitation. This selec-
tion effect seems, however, to have become much weaker over time. The 
                                                      
22 To some extent the male premiums can be explained by the fact that married/cohabiting fathers 
have higher education and have more work experience and seniority than mothers and 
childless/single men. We further found the correlates of authority to have changed during the 
period of study. It has become increasingly difficult to predict authority with observables, which 
indicates that factors other than those observed in the data set have become more important for 
the attainment of authority over time. A parallel to this result can be found in Swedish studies of 
wage differentials, where the variance explained by traditional Mincer equations has diminished 
somewhat over time (Edin & Richardsson 2002; le Grand et al. 2001). For one reason or the 
other, employers have begun to let individual differences other than those that are easily 
observed affect the decision to promote. Whether this is a long-term trend or just random 
fluctuation is too early to tell. More (longitudinal) studies of the predictors of authority are 
needed to know whether our result indicates a more general phenomenon, rather than being 
idiosyncratic to the Swedish labor market during this particular period of time. 
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have become less interested in marriage/cohabitation, or women to a lesser 
extent in the 1990s than in the late 1960s and 70s have preferences to mate 
with authority-prone men.
23 Employers may also decreasingly choose to 
promote married and cohabiting men. Like the cross-sectional analysis, the 
fixed effects panel analysis suggests that having children does not affect the 
chance for women to have authority, but increases the chance for men to have 
authority. In other words, the gender gap in workplace authority, that appears 
only after parenthood, is due to the fathers’ gain in chances for promotion 
compared to when they were childless. 
The differences in findings and conclusions between analyses based on 
cross-sectional and panel data respectively show that the association between 
family conditions and the gender gap in workplace authority is more complex 
than could be grasped in cross-sectional data, and the evidence we have had 
access to, so far, has relied on such data. Hence we would like to underscore 
the importance of longitudinal data for future studies in this field of research. 
Previous estimates of gender-specific effects of family factors on workplace 
authority are likely to be biased, because men and women are not randomly 
selected into cohabitation, marriage, and parenthood.  
A main finding in this paper, then, is that men face better promotion 
chances when they become fathers. We outline two, possibly complementary, 
explanations of this empirical fact. First, it may be generated by a typically 
male response to the life-event of becoming a father. Because of sociali-
zation/norms/biology men react to this event in a gender-stereotypical way. 
They take the traditional household provider role, and entering into an authority 
position in their workplace may be one way of doing this. Women, instead, 
take the traditional role of caring for their children, which only with difficulty 
can be combined with an active career involving authority and the like. A sub-
stantial part of the gender gap in authority among parents can be explained by 
fathers’ higher levels of, and higher returns to, education, work experience, and 
seniority. Becoming a father therefore seems to make men more prone to 
devote energy to market work, and human capital accumulation relevant to the 
exertion of authority. 
                                                      
23 One way this change may have come about is that women with increasing labor participation 
(and divorce) rates have become accustomed not to rely on their men to take responsibility for 
their economic well-being. 
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become fathers. Because of norms and expectations around parenthood, 
employers may interpret the event of a man becoming a father as a signal that 
he is now prepared to take on more responsibilities at work, an interpretation 
that is unlikely to be made when a woman becomes a mother (see Bielby & 
Baron 1986). On the contrary, employers may (often correctly) anticipate that 
when women become parents, they take the main responsibility for the chil-
dren. Given the gender bias in child and household responsibilities, statistical 
discrimination against (potential) mothers, by not promoting them, may appear 
as a rational strategy for employers. 
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